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Retiree Health Benefits: The Promise of a Lifetime?
There were promises made across this desk!
You mustn't tell me you've got people to see -
I put 34 years into this firm... and now I
can't pay my insurance? You can't eat the orange
and throw the peel away - a man is not a piece
of fruit!
Willy Loman in Arthur Miller's
Death of a Salesman
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
The alarming increase in health care costs concerns most Americans.' Of
particular concern is the cost of providing health care once a person retires.
Medicare, enacted in 1966, was expected to cover the health care needs of those
over sixty-five years of age.2 However, as the gap increased between actual
health care costs and Medicare coverage, many employers agreed to provide
supplemental health insurance for their retirees.3 While employers are not re-
quired by law to provide these benefits, 4 many employers offer them as an in-
centive to attract and retain good employees. 5
Most companies do not prefund these benefit plans but instead operate on a
ccpay-as-you-go" system.6 In the past this strategy has worked well since the
costs of the programs were relatively small. However, a number of factors in-
cluding high medical care inflation,7 a general aging in the population,8 in-
1. The cost of health care accounts for approximately 11% of the GNP. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimates that physician's fees have increased over 262% since 1967 and the cost of hospital stays, i.e., room and
board, has increased more than 824% since 1965. See Hosay, Recent Efforts to Control Health Care Costs, 1985
PRoc. OF N.Y.U. 38TH ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 3-1, 3-2.
2. Jones, Staying Afloat: Public Employer Retiree Health Plans, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN RaV., July, 1989
at 52.
3. Ninety-four percent of those companies employing 10,000 or more workers offer retiree health care bene-
fits, and 42% of companies with less than 100 employees have retiree health plans. Most employers pay the entire
cost of the plans, which usually cover hospitalization and a portion of prescriptions and doctors' fees. Bennett,
Firms Stunned By Retiree Health Costs, Wall St. J., May 24, 1988, at 41, col. 3.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988).
5. Van Olson, Nonpension Retiree Benefits: Are They for Life? Management Guidelines to the Issue, 36
LAB. LJ. 402, 408 (1985).
6. In a recent survey, 84% of the employers polled indicated that they funded health care benefits for retirees
on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Burcke, Few Employers Determine Cost of Retiree Care, Bus. Ins., Feb. 13, 1989, at
1, col. 1.
7. See supra note I and accompanying text.
8. The population over age 60 will increase rapidly in the near future. In 1980 the median age of the popula-
tion was 30. By the year 2050 the median age is expected to increase to 42. Demographics May Dictate Retire-
ment Policy Changes, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REv., Dec., 1988 at 58.
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creased life expectancy,9 the trend toward early retirement,10 and the federal
government's reduction of Medicare coverage"1 has resulted in a dire situation
for employers as well as retirees. Recent studies estimate the aggregate accrued
liability of retiree health care benefits at $200 billion.1 2 When this is coupled
with the $700 billion in pension debt which corporations owe employees, em-
ployee debt is the largest corporate debt category in America.13 In comparison,
corporations owe about $500 billion each to bond holders and banks.14
The impact of the massive retiree health care debt will be felt in 1992
when the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) will implement a new
accounting rule requiring companies to include the present value of future
health care obligations as a liability on their balance sheets.1 5 In accounting
terminology, the new rule mandates accrual basis accounting rather than the
cash basis (i.e., "pay-as-you-go") method currently used by most companies.'0
In financial terminology the new rule means less profits. The nation's cor-
porations could experience a twenty-five to fifty percent decrease in profits once
these liabilities are figured into the balance sheets.' 7 Companies are, under-
standably, concerned about the effects of the new ruling. As one commentator
noted, a $100 million clean up order from the Environmental Protection Agency
can alone bankrupt many small companies, and the new FASB rule has the
potential of being equally devastating.' 8 The potential for serious problems and
possibly financial ruin is present in the unfunded retiree liability situation.
Many companies, in an attempt to avoid financial problems resulting from
retiree health care liabilities, have restructured health care benefits. In many
cases the employers have totally cut or reduced health care benefits for their
retired employees,' 9 thus leaving many retirees and/or their dependents in des-
perate straits. Retirees, especially those under the age of sixty-five, and thus not
covered by Medicare, may suffer severe financial hardships when health care
benefits are suddenly terminated or altered.20 A serious illness can financially
9. In 1980 the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that the average life expectancy at 65 was 15.5 years. In 1990
the Bureau projects that a 65-year-old can expect to live 16.8 more years. Id.
10. The Department of Labor found that in 1970 49% of 65-year-old men were in the work force as com-
pared to 1986 when only 30.8% of 65-year-old men were still employed. Id. It is estimated that by 1996 for every
two workers on payroll, an employer will be providing health care benefits for one retiree. Adler, Retiree Health
Care Costs Staggering, Bus. Ins., June 6, 1988, at 10, col. 1.
11. Jones, supra note 2, at 52-53.
12. This estimate is based on studies by the U.S. Government General Accounting Office and the Employee
Benefits Research Institute. Standard actuarial techniques were used which took into account reasonable health
care cost projections and investment discount rates. Ambachtsheer, Employee Benefits as Corporate Debt: What
Investment Professionals Should Know, FiN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 5.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. In figuring future health care liabilities, companies must take into account all existing retirees plus any
active employees who are eligible for retirement. Total liability will not be figured in the first year, but will be
phased-in gradually over a number of years. Burcke, supra note 6, at 28, col. 1. See also Bennett, supra note 3.
16. See supra note 6.
17. Bennett, supra note 3, at 41, col. 4.
18. Adler, supra note 10, at 10, col. 1, 3.
19. Thirty-nine percent of employers offering retiree health care plans have changed coverage in the last two
years. Burcke, supra note 6, at 28, col. 5.
20. See, e.g., Note, Employee Benefits Law: Securing Employee Welfare Benefits Through ERISA, 61 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 551, 552 n.10 (1986).
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devastate a retiree in this situation.2 1 Furthermore, a retiree, by virtue of being
retired, has no bargaining power with an employer, thus leaving litigation as the
only remedy.22 In fact, many cases have been litigated on the issue of employer
reduction/termination of retiree health care benefit plans.2"
The purpose of this Note is to present an understandable discussion of the
statutes and legislative history applicable to this area of litigation as well as the
case law and legal theories which have developed. As will be shown, the results
are often dissatisfying and continue to leave both employers and employees in
uncertain positions. To this end, I shall propose suggestions to remedy the
problems faced in the area of retiree health benefits.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND-ERISA, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, AND
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Employee retirement benefits are governed by both statute and a special-
ized area of federal common law.2 4 The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) 25 was promulgated by Congress "to promote the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.'""8 Employers are
not required to provide benefits plans, 27 but once plans are provided they must
comply with ERISA regulations.2 8 ERISA governs two types of benefit plans:
(1) pension plans, and (2) welfare benefit plans 9 (which include retiree insur-
ance benefits, the topic of this Note3 0). Pension plans provide retirement income
to retirees, usually in the form of deferred income,3 1 and are comprehensively
regulated by ERISA. For example, an employer must prefund pension plans.3 2
However, employer contributions to the plan are tax deductible.32 Additionally,
ERISA provides vesting requirements for pension plans, which means that upon
fulfillment of the statutory conditions, such as meeting certain age and service
requirements, the employee has a legal and nonforfeitable right to the
benefits."'
Welfare benefits, on the other hand, are not so completely regulated by
ERISA. In contrast to pension benefits, welfare benefits have no funding re-
quirements35 nor are there any tax breaks for doing so.3 Most important to this
21. Id.
22. See Reducing Retirees' Health Benefits: The Courts Develop a Remedy, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1399
(1985).
23. See infra notes 71-168 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Van Olson, supra note 5, at 402-03.
25. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-461 (1988).
26. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1003.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(B).
30. Welfare benefit plans are defined as any plan which provides, among other things, medical, surgical,
hospital, sickness, accident, disability, or death benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(A).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1082.
33. I.R.C. §§ 401, 404 (1988).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61.
35. I.R.C. § 401.
36. Id.
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Note, welfare benefits are exempted from the vesting requirements of pension
plans.3 7 The exemption of welfare benefit plans from the minimum vesting re-
quirements leaves both employers and employees in uncertain positions. The
statute does not state whether welfare benefit plans ever vest, nor does it specifi-
cally allow for employers to change or terminate welfare benefit plans. 38
Furthermore, neither state common law nor state statutory law may be
used to fill in the gaps where ERISA is silent.39 ERISA specifically preempts all
state laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan regulated by
ERISA.4 0 The Supreme Court has made it clear that the preemption language
of ERISA must be construed broadly. In Shaw v. Delta Airlines the Court
rejected the view that states could regulate those areas in which ERISA was
silent.4 2 In a later case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the
Court went further in holding that "[tihe pre-emption provision was intended to
displace all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that
are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. 42
Many courts and commentators believe that Congress intended the gaps in
ERISA to be filled by a common law developed by the federal courts.4 3 Al-
though the federal courts do not have the power to promulgate a body of com-
mon law, 44 they do have the power to interpret laws enacted by Congress." This
power includes the authority to develop rules where Congress has not spoken.
4 1
However, in order to exercise this authority, the courts must be certain that
Congress purposely left a void to be filled by the courts.17 Congressional intent
is often sought in a statute's legislative history. There are several items of legis-
lative history which courts cite in supporting congressional intent for federal
courts to develop judicial ERISA law .4  These items of legislative history in-
clude statements made by the proponents of ERISA when presenting it to the
Senate."'
The presentation to the Senate of the House Conference Report of the
Committee on Pension Benefit Reform"° is relied upon most heavily in support-
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1).
38. See Van Olson, supra note 5, at 403.
39. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, regulation of employee benefit plans were, for the most part, left to the
realm of state law. See Ray, The Russell Case: Retreat in the Development of ERISA Common Law? 1986 PRoc
OF N.Y.U. 39TH ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 5-1, 5-11.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
41. 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983).
42. 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 48-59.
44. City of Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304, 312-14 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Trans. Workers, 451 US.
77, 95-96 (1981). See generally Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 1
(1985).
45. Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. at 314.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 313-14.
48. See Note, supra note 20, at 556.
49. Id.
50. JoiNT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 327 (1974), reprinted in 1974 US. CODE CONG. & ADMN. Naws 5038, and in 3 LEGISLATIVE HILORY
OF THE EMPLOYEE REnREMENT INCOME SEcuPrTy ACT OF 1974, at 4277 (1976).
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ing the courts' ERISA common law power.5' Senator Javits, ranking minority
member of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and a primary
sponsor of ERISA, said during the presentation of ERISA, "[i]t is also in-
tended that a body of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pen-
sion plans." '52
Another statement frequently cited by the courts is that of Senator Wil-
liams, the Labor and Public Welfare Committee Chairman and another main
proponent of ERISA.5 Williams stated that suits arising under ERISA "will be
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to
those brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act."5'
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills the Supreme Court established the
well-accepted principle that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (i.e., Taft-Hartley Act) gave federal courts the authority to fill in statutory
gaps by formulating common law congruent with the policies set forth by Con-
gress.55 In Lincoln Mills the Court stated:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. The Labor
Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out
what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in
the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction
but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy
that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined
by the nature of the problem. (citations omitted)56
The courts, as a result of this case, have created a large body of substantive law
in the area of labor relations. 57 Senator Williams' statement suggests that Con-
gress intended for the federal courts to treat ERISA in the same manner as the
Taft-Hartley Act. The lower federal courts have embraced this idea since
shortly after ERISA was enacted. 58 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the federal courts' role in developing a body of common law to supple-
ment ERISA.59
Therefore, in the situation in which ERISA is silent as to the vesting, mod-
ification, and termination of employee welfare benefits, the federal courts have
recognized causes of action upon which employees may base claims. Addition-
ally, the courts have used federal common law to guide their decisions in these
cases.
51. See Note, supra note 20, at 557.
52. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing 120
CONG. REc. 22, 29942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RELREMENT INCOME
SEcuRITY ACT OF 1974, at 4771 (1976)).
53. Id. (citing 120 CONG. REc. 22, 29933 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT SECURrTY ACT OF 1974, at 4745 (1976)).
54. Id.
55. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
56. Id. at 456-57.
57. See Ray, supra note 39, at 5-11 n.20.
58. Id. at 5-3 n.7.
59. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 56 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
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Basically, three theories have been proposed in suits involving the modifica-
tion or termination of a retirement welfare benefit: (1) fiduciary duty, (2) status
benefit, and (3) contract. The next section of this Note will explain and discuss
each of these theories.
III. LEGAL THEORIES
A. Fiduciary Duties
1. The Concept of a Fiduciary Under ERISA
One theory used by employees in bringing suit against employers for reduc-
ing or terminating welfare benefits is that the employers have breached fiduci-
ary duties owed under ERISA. Employers establishing an employee benefit plan
are governed by ERISA,6° which requires the naming of a fiduciary who "shall
have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the
plan." 61 Frequently the employer will name itself as the fiduciary. However, the
employer may also be constructively deemed the fiduciary although it did not
explicitly appoint itself as such. ERISA defines a fiduciary as a person who
exercises any discretionary authority or control regarding the management or
disposition of plan assets,6 2 and courts have held that the term "fiduciary"
under ERISA must be construed broadly.63 Further, Congress has stated that
persons will be deemed fiduciaries if they "have authority and responsibility
with respect to the matter in question, regardless of their formal title."" There-
fore, a corporation is a fiduciary to the extent that it exercises any discretionary
management or control over an employee benefits plan. 5
Once one is deemed a fiduciary, very strict duties are imposed by ERISA.
In pertinent part, ERISA defines those duties by stating:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries and -
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;...
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevail-
ing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.68
60. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
63. Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1984).
64. JOINT EXPLANATION STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 323 (1974), reprinted in 1974 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5038, 5103, and in 3 LEGISLATIVE
HIsToRy OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECUITY AcT OF 1974, at 4277, 4590 (1976).
65. Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group, Inc., 805 F.2d 732, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
915 (1987); Sommers Drug Stores v. Corrigan Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1460 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1034 (1987); Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1417 (2d Cir. 1985) cert. dismissed, 474
U.S. 1113 (1986); Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 133 (7th Cir. 1984); Monson v. Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d
1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1984); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 458 (10th Cir. 1978).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988).
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Furthermore, ERISA imposes liability for a breach of fiduciary duty6 7 and spe-
cifically prohibits certain transactions.6 8 For example, a fiduciary shall not, in
any transaction involving the plan, act on behalf of a party whose interests are
adverse to those of the plan or its beneficiaries.6 9 Any alleged breach by a fidu-
ciary may be sued upon under provisions of ERISA which allow a beneficiary to
bring a civil action."0
2. Application of the ERISA Fiduciary Duty in Cases Involving the
Modification of Welfare Benefit Plans
Given the courts' liberality in constructively deeming employers fiducia-
rieS71 and the very strict duties imposed on fiduciaries to act in the interests of
plan beneficiaries,7 2 it would seem that employees would be successful in suits
where the employer has modified the terms of the welfare benefit plan to the
detriment of the beneficiaries. Surprisingly, however, employees have usually
failed under this theory. The failure is due to the courts' differentiation between
the employer in its role as a plan fiduciary and in its role as an employer. This
differentiation is frequently explained as the "two hat analysis."
In the case of Amato v. Western Union International, Inc.7 3 the court held
that ERISA allows an employer who is also a plan administrator to wear "two
hats," and an employer is bound by the fiduciary duties of ERISA only when
and to the extent the employer is functioning in its capacity as plan administra-
tor. When the employer takes off the plan administrator hat and dons its em-
ployer hat, it is not bound by ERISA. 4 The court further held that modifying
the terms of employee benefit plans is an "employer" function.7 5 Therefore,
since the employer is not wearing its plan administrator hat in taking this ac-
tion, the fiduciary duties do not attach, and thus there can be no breach of duty.
Many cases have followed the Amato analysis and distinguish the adminis-
tration and management of a plan in accordance with its terms from setting the
terms of the plan.7 6 The rationale for this distinction is that ERISA does not
require an employer to establish an employee benefit plan, but rather governs a
plan once it is established. 77 Therefore, an employer who decides to provide a
benefit plan should not be denied the right to change the plan when there are
67. 29 U.S.C. 1105.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1106.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
71. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
73. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986).
74. Id. at 1416-17.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Mutso v. American General Corp,, 861 F.2d 897, 911-12 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 1745 (1989); U.A.W. v. Park-Ohio Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1281, 1300-01 (N.D. Ohio 1987). See also
Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984); Sutton v. Weirton Steel
Div., 724 F.2d 406, 411 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984) (both cases differentiate between
administration and setting the terms of a plan in the area of pension benefits).
77. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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employers who provided no benefit plans at all.78 As Judge Celebrezze stated in
Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program:78
Neither Congress nor the courts are involved in either the decision to establish a plan
or in the decision concerning which benefits a plan should provide. In particular,
courts have no authority to decide which benefits employers must confer upon their
employees; these are decisions which are more appropriately influenced by forces in
the marketplace, and, when appropriate, by federal legislation."0
Although Moore v. Reynolds Metals involved a pension plan rather than
an employee welfare benefit plan, the argument that employers should have free
reign in modifying plans since they are under no obligation to provide them is
equally applicable to the welfare benefit situation." In fact, the argument may
be even stronger since ERISA specifically exempts welfare plans from the statu-
tory vesting of pension plans."2 Furthermore, evidence suggests that Congress
was concerned that employers would be deterred from establishing plans if vest-
ing requirements were too comprehensive. Vesting would lock employers into
providing the benefits, and the cost of such a program could put too much of a
financial burden on employers.83 Therefore, perhaps the courts accepting the
"two hat analysis" have correctly applied Congress' intent to maintain flexibil-
ity in the provision and modification of welfare benefit plans.
However, adopting the rationale that employers are free to change the
terms of the welfare benefit plans leads to a rather bizarre result when coupled
with the fiduciary duty language of ERISA. Presumably, an employer has more
freedom in changing the language of a benefit plan than in construing the lan-
guage of the plan.84 According to Amato, an employer may change a welfare
benefit plan without fiduciary duties of ERISA attaching. However, if an em-
ployer is acting as an administrator of the plan, fiduciary duties attach and the
employer must act in the best interest of the plan's beneficiaries. 5 Carrying
these propositions to their logical ends, the fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA is
made illusory in this type of situation. An employer wearing the fiduciary hat
who does not want to provide benefits as provided by the plan need only replace
the fiduciary hat with the employer hat and change the plan's language.88
78. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div., 724 F.2d at 411.
79, 740 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 456.
81. Id.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
83. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 US. CODE CONo. & AnMI. NEws
4890, 4904, and in I LEGiSLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURIrY ACT OF 1974, at
1063, 1086 (1976).
84. See Baker v. Lukens Steel Co., 793 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1986).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
86. This presumably only applies to at-will employees since in the case of a union employee, a welfare benefit
plan would be part of the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, would have the force of a contractual




3. The Standard of Review of Fiduciaries Construing Welfare Benefit Plan
Language
Some cases have been litigated in which it was presumed that the employer
was wearing its plan administrator hat and allegedly breached its fiduciary duty
by construing the terms of the plan so as to deny employees welfare benefits.
Employees have been generally unsuccessful in these cases since, until recently,
courts have applied an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review to the
decisions of the plan administrators/employers. The result of this standard is to
give a great deal of deference to plan administrators while imposing a very
heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff.8 7 The arbitrary and capricious standard
of review has its origins in trust law. A well-established principle of trust law
gives a trustee broad discretion in distributing the assets of a trust unless there
is explicit language limiting the trustee's discretion.8 Therefore, "[w]here dis-
cretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its
exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the
trustee of his discretion."8 9 Thus, a great deal of deference is afforded trustees
by the courts. However, one exception to this deference is when "the trustee has
an interest conflicting with that of the beneficiary." 90 In this situation courts
will place a greater check on the trustee's exercise of discretion.9 1
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review for ERISA cases did not
derive directly from these common law principles of trust, but instead came
through the intermediary of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).9 2
The Labor Management Relations Act provides for the establishment of pen-
sion plans for union employees with such plans to be administered by a board in
which employers and employees are equally represented.9 3 Because the conflicts
of interest are equalized due to the makeup of the trustees, courts, in accor-
dance with principles of trust law, granted LMRA pension plan trustees a great
deal of deference.9 4 The case of Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America8
established the standard of review in LMRA cases as "whether the action of the
trustees is in any way arbitrary or capricious."96 Thereafter the arbitrary and
capricious standard became well-accepted in reviewing the actions of LMRA
pension plan administrators.9 7
Because courts frequently draw on LMRA principles when dealing with
analogous situations under ERISA, 98 it was natural that courts should automat-
87. See generally Page, Retiree Insurance Benefits: Enforcing Employer Obligations, 1987 LAB. LJ. 496,
501.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 187 (1959).
89. Id.
90. Id. comment g.
91. Id.
92. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1987), af'd in relevant part, 489
U.S. 101 (1989).
93. Id. at 141.
94. Id. at 141-43.
95. 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960).
96. Id. at 318.
97. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 143.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
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ically adopt the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing fiduciary du-
ties of plan administrators under ERISA.99 Numerous cases have been decided
using the arbitrary and capricious standard in benefit plans regulated by
ERISA.100
However, a few federal circuit courts, and most recently the United States
Supreme Court,' 0 ' have expressed dissatisfaction with the application of the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard to ERISA cases. Many of the lower federal
courts have expressed discontent with the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. 1 2 The court in Struble v. New Jersey Employees' Welfare Trust
Fund'03 justified not applying the arbitrary and capricious standard based on
the type of challenge that was made to fiduciary loyalty. 04 The situation in
Struble involved a collective bargaining agreement between union and employer
in which the employer was to contribute a set dollar amount per employee into
a retiree welfare benefit plan. 05 However, the trust fund became overfunded in
that the employer contributed more money to the fund than it would cost to
provide the amount of benefits promised under the welfare benefit plan. The
trustees refunded the excess money to the employer on the theory that the em-
ployers were only required to fund a certain level of benefits, and having met
that obligation, were entitled to the excess. The employees sued, alleging that
the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties because the employers were
contractually obligated to contribute a set amount per employee, and any result-
ing overfunding should be used to increase, the level of benefits under the wel-
fare plan. 06
In this case, a per se conflict of interest problem was not present as the
fiduciaries were half union representatives and half employer representatives. 07
Therefore, this factor was not the rationale for the court refusing to apply the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 08 Rather, the court made a distinction be-
tween claims in which the trustees are balancing the individual's claim against
the interest of future claimants, and, as in this situation, where the trustees
have advanced the interests of non-beneficiaries. 109
The court found the arbitrary and capricious standard appropriate in the
situation involving an individual claimant. In such a situation the trustees are
balancing the interests of the individual beneficiaries against all of the other
beneficiaries who may later have a claim. This is different from the case here
where "the trustees have sacrificed the interests of the beneficiaries as a class in
99. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 143 (citing the first cases to apply the LMRA standard to ERISA).
100. Id. at 138.
101. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
102. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 139.
103. 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984).
104. Id. at 333.
105. Id. at 329.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
109. Struble, 732 F.2d at 333-34.
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favor of some third party's interests." 1 0 Therefore, the court held the appropri-
ate standard to be the prudent man standard of ERISA."1
Other courts have based dissatisfaction with the arbitrary and capricious
standard on the fact that, unlike LMRA cases, the ERISA plan administrator
is frequently the employer and, therefore, operates under a conflict of interest.
Common law trust principles dictate against broad discretion to a trustee whose
own interests may conflict with the interests of beneficiaries." 2
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co."3 is one case involving a trustee
conflict of interest. In Bruch, Firestone was both the employer and the plan
administrator of certain welfare benefit plans.11 ' Firestone sold one of its subsid-
iaries and the plaintiffs, employees of the subsidiary, attempted to collect wel-
fare benefits from Firestone. Firestone refused to award the requested benefits
based on its construction of the plans' terms.11 5 Plaintiffs brought suit alleging
that Firestone had breached its fiduciary duty as a plan administrator. The dis-
trict court, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, held for
Firestone. Under the deferential standard, the court did not believe it could
reverse the administrator's construction of the plan's language." 6
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the plaintiffs urged against application of
the arbitrary standard, arguing that "both the common law of trusts and federal
common law developed pursuant to ERISA counsel against deferring to deci-
sions by fiduciaries with interests adverse to those of the claimants."11 7 The
court recognized at least two instances when a conflict can occur:
[A] conflict can occur, for example, if the employer is the plan administrator and the
plan provides that the employer's contributions in a given year are determined by the
cost of satisfying plan liabilities in the prior year. Or, as in this case. . . a conflict of
interest may occur if the plan administrator is also the employer and the plan is un-
funded, so that any benefits provided by the plan are paid directly by the employer out
of its general corporate funds."18
The court refused to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard, basing its
opinion in part on the conflict of interest present in this case." 9
The court acknowledged that a frequently cited rationale for the arbitrary
and capricious standard is that a plan administrator has more expertise than a
judge in managing and determining the meaning of a plan's terms. 20 The court,
while admitting that trustees were better able to make some decisions (such as
investing plan funds), refused to give them across the board deference. Courts
are better suited to make certain other decisions, such as when "the validity of
110. Id. at 333.
111. Id. at 332-33. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
113. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), affd in relevant part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
114. Bruch, 828 F.2d at 136.
115. Id. at 137.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 137-38.
119. Id. at 144.
120. Id.
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the claim is likely to turn on a question of law or of contract interpretation."11 2 '
Courts are especially in a better position to make these decisions when the ad-
ministrator has a conflict of interest.1 22 In this case the court applied a de novo
standard of review in that it rendered the decision by interpreting the language
of the contract. The court applied pure contract principles and gave no special
deference to either party.123
Bruch was appealed to the Supreme Court, 2 4 which resulted in the Court
establishing a blanket rule that all actions brought under ERISA which chal-
lenge denials of benefits based on plan interpretation will be reviewed using a de
novo standard. 2 5 The Court, recognizing that ERISA established no standard
on which courts are to review fiduciary duties, 2 ' found the authority to estab-
lish a standard based on the principle that courts are to promulgate a body of
federal common law where ERISA is silent. 2
7
Although the Court affirmed the de novo standard of the lower court, it did
so on a different rationale. While the lower court based its decision on the con-
cern of an impartial plan administrator, the Supreme Court found the basis for
a de novo standard in trust law. 12 The Court, citing trust commentators and
cases,'2 29 found that discretion was owed to a trustee only when the terms of the
trust agreement specifically gave the trustee such discretion. 30 When the au-
thorization for the trustee to exercise discretion is absent, the proper role of a
court is to interpret the terms of the trust without giving deference to either
party. ' When the trust agreement is written, courts should look at the lan-
guage of the agreement and also consider other evidence, such as the circum-
stances and intent.' 3
2
This procedure, basically a contract interpretation standard, was used to
review employee benefit claims arising before the enactment of ERISA. 33 The
Court noted that the intent of ERISA was to protect the contractual rights of
employees to benefit plans and generally further the interests of employees in
employee benefits."" However, allowing the trustees of such plans broad discre-
tion in administration actually gave employees less protection than before
ERISA's enactment."-5 As one commentator has noted, several courts, in exer-
cising discretionary review, have upheld the fiduciary's decision when in fact, if
the courts had applied a de novo review of the contracts, they would have
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 145.
124. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
125. Id. at 108, 115.
126. Id. at 109.
127. Id. at 110. See also supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
128. 489 U.S. at 111-12, 115.
129. Id. at 111-12.
130. Id..




135. Id. at 113-14.
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reached an opposite result.136 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the
arbitrary and capricious review of employee benefit plans contravened the intent
of ERISA.137
The de novo review mandated by the Supreme Court will afford greater
protection to employees because ERISA fiduciaries will no longer have the al-
most carte blanche authority to interpret terms of the plan agreements. How-
ever, the de novo review is only applicable to disputes arising from the interpre-
tation of plan language. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Bruch specifically
exempted de novo review from situations in which the benefit plan explicitly
gave the fiduciary the power to construe the terms of the plan. 38a The new stan-
dard does nothing to prevent a fiduciary/employer from putting on its employer
hat and adding a clause giving the fiduciary discretion or changing any of the
other terms of the plan. Presumably union employees will be able to protect
themselves from this type of employer action since the welfare benefit plans are
negotiated and become part of the collective bargaining agreement. However,
most salaried employees, being employees at will, do not have this type of
protection.
B. The Rise and Fall of the Status Benefit Theory
One approach to deal with the inequity of an employer's power to termi-
nate or modify welfare benefit plans was the status benefit theory, a concept
created by the federal courts pursuant to their judicial law-making authority.13 9
The courts, recognizing that ERISA did not provide vesting requirements for
welfare benefit plans as it did for pension plans,"10 attempted to fill this void by
developing a common law theory that welfare benefits vested per se upon an
employee's retirement. However, as will be discussed, the theory never became
widely recognized and was rejected by most courts.
The idea of the status benefit theory first appeared in UAW v. Yard-Man,
Inc." This case involved a collective bargaining agreement, entered into in
1974 between Yard-Man and the union. Subsequently, Yard-Man closed its
plant and informed retirees that their health and life insurance benefits would
be terminated at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement." 2 The
union brought suit and obtained a favorable judgment. The court found that the
welfare benefits had vested in those who had retired and that the benefits were
to continue indefinitely.", 3 The Yard-Man court based its decision solely on
traditional contract theory."'4 However, the court also added that "retiree bene-
fits are in a sense 'status' benefits which, as such, carry with them an inference
136. Page, supra note 87, at 501.
137. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 113-14.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
141. 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).
142. Id. at 1478.
143. Id. at 1481.
144. Id. at 1479-80.
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that they continue so long as the prerequisite status is maintained."'" That is,
"when the parties contract for benefits which accrue upon achievement of re-
tiree status, there is an inference that the parties likely intended those benefits
to continue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree."'146
Later, in Eardman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,"' the District Court for the
Western District of New York gave weight to the status theory set forth in
Yard-Man.'" This case was basically decided on contract theory. The court
found that despite a clause in the single plan document in which the company
reserved the right to reduce or terminate retirement welfare benefits, extrinsic
evidence indicated that the company did not intend to reserve the right to alter
or terminate benefits. 49 The evidence relied on by the court included other doc-
uments given to employees and statements made to retirees during their exit
interviews, all of which indicated that welfare benefits would be provided
throughout their lifetimes.6 0 However, the court also cited the status benefit
theory set forth in Yard-Man.15
While the court agreed with Yard-Man in that there is an implication that
retiree benefits vest upon the time the employee reaches the status of retire-
ment, it held that "such implication, in and of itself would be insufficient to
support a finding of an intent to establish interminable benefits. 1' 62 Therefore,
the Eardman court used the status benefit theory as one factor among many in
determining that welfare benefits had vested.
The status benefit theory reached the high-water mark in the case of In Re
White Farm Equipment Co.'53 in which the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio held that welfare benefits vest upon retirement.' 5' Once the
employee retires, thus causing the benefits to vest, the employer cannot termi-
nate or reduce the benefits even if the plan language specifically authorized
such action.' 55 The court found authority for this principle in the fact that
ERISA was silent on the issue of welfare benefits vesting and federal courts
were allowed to formulate law where ERISA left gaps. 56
The employer appealed the District Court's decision to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.' The Sixth Circuit rejected the absolute vesting rule set
forth by the District Court due to lack of precedential support.158 The court
remained neutral on Congress' exemption of welfare benefit plans from the vest-
ing scheme of pension plans. While the court did not interpret congressional
145. Id. at 1482.
146. Id.
147. 607 F. Supp. 196 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985).
148. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
149. Bethlehem Steel, 607 F. Supp. at 198.
150. Id. at 209.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 42 B.R. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986).
154. Id. at 1016-19.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1014-16.
157. In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986).
158. Id. at 1192-93.
[Vol. 51:985
RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS
silence to mean that welfare benefits do not vest,15 9 it also refused to impose a
judicial rule mandating vesting.'6 0 The court stated that the legislature, rather
than the courts, is the proper body to determine this issue.'
Other courts have agreed with the Sixth Circuit's rejection of a status ben-
efit rule imposing mandatory vesting. The Eighth Circuit, in Anderson v. Alpha
Portland Industries, Inc. rejected the concept of per se status vesting and re-




The Sixth Circuit in White ultimately determined that the welfare benefit
plan was ambiguous as to whether the employer had reserved the right to termi-
nate welfare benefits.' 6 3 The court admitted extrinsic evidence to determine the
parties' intent."" This approach represents a straight forward application of
contract principles, similar to the approach advocated by the Supreme Court in
Bruch.16 5 The courts in Yard-Man and Eardman, although approving of the
status benefit theory, found independent support for the holdings in contract
law. 16 The majority of cases determining whether retired employees are enti-
tled to welfare benefits have followed these courts in applying contract analy-
sis. 167 As mentioned in the above cases, courts will generally look first to the
plan language, but will also consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether
the employer may alter or terminate welfare benefits.' 68
IV. CONCLUSION
Since employers are not required to provide retirement welfare benefits
such as health insurance, and given the escalating costs of providing these bene-
fits, it is certainly reasonable that employers should be able to contractually
specify (or in the union context negotiate) what benefits are to be provided and
to state whether they reserve the right to modify or terminate the benefits. As
long as the employer clearly states its position to the employee, the employee
can plan for his or her retirement needs.
Unfortunately, the above procedure is rarely followed in the real world.
Instead, many employees find themselves in the situation of Willy Loman in
Death of a Salesman. Employers made promises, employees relied on them, and
159. Id. at 1192.
160. Id. at 1193.
161. Id.
162. 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub. nom., Anderson v. Slattery Group, Inc., 489 U.S. 1051
(1989).
163. In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d at 1193-94.
164. Id. at 1193.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 123-36.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 141-52.
167. See Comment, Retiree Welfare Benefits: ERISA, LMRA and the Federal Common Law, 20 AKRON L.
Rav. 455, 460-68 (1987).
168. Id.
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suddenly employees find themselves discarded by the employers who fail to
honor the promises.
This situation manifests itself in basically two ways with retiree welfare
benefits. First, the employer may reserve termination/modification rights in the
plan document required by ERISA, but represent to the employee that the ben-
efits are for life. Some courts, if they are sympathetic to the employees, will
consider this extrinsic evidence as the employer's intent to provide the benefits
without change or termination. Other courts, recognizing the potentially devas-
tating cost of providing these unfunded benefits, will allow the employers to
reduce or terminate benefits.
The second situation occurs when at the time an employee is hired, the
employer agrees to provide lifetime welfare benefits. However, after the em-
ployee has served the company, perhaps for many years, or has retired from the
company, the employer changes the plan language so as to allow it to alter or
terminate the welfare benefits.
In both scenarios the employee has relied on the promises. When the em-
ployer modifies or refuses to provide benefits, it may be too expensive for an
employee to obtain similar insurance coverage. For example, a sixty-year-old
with cancer, a disease that can financially devastate without insurance coverage,
will find it difficult to obtain insurance, and will be ineligible for Medicare be-
cause he is not sixty-five.
I believe the only solution to these problems is to subject employee welfare
plans to the vesting requirements similar to ERISA pension plans. To assure the
vested benefits will actually be paid, employers should be required to fund the
plans. Vesting and funding are effective ways for employers to contain liabilities
while providing employees stability in planning for retirement. However, since
ERISA remains silent in this area and courts believe they lack authority to fill
the voids of ERISA, Congress must be the one to act.
Janilyn S. Brouwer*
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